
The reason for this comment is a long conversation I had these days with the well-known intellectual and civil activist, Irena Beqiraj. The point is to find some kind of answer as to why our state administration has collapsed so much, to reach today's level dominated by mediocrity, disrespect for written rules, unconditionally putting itself at the service of the ruling political elite and the oligarchy associated with it, widely using it as a contingent of electoral propagandists for the ruling party, as well as turning a part of it into direct beneficiaries of public funds, permits and licenses, etc. That is, the action of this administration in conditions of conflict of interest and, fundamentally, to the detriment of the public interest.
As a result, an increasing number of citizens, although educated and experienced at various levels of central and local government, with a willingness to contribute to the common good, feel excluded from public goods, from public life, etc. They are seen by the government as a threat or a danger and remain simply a subject of tax contributions, but are in no way respected or included as actors who move society forward. That is, the knowledge, expertise, integrity and reputation of this social category, ironically, becomes the "roadblock" that retires them at the age of 50 and keeps them away from any professional public engagement.
The reasoning in search of the answer undoubtedly leads to the country's leadership, to the motives and interests of this leadership that promote the shaping of public administration in the well-known duality between the "technical" and the "loyal", without being able to ensure a balance between them, but leaning broadly in favor of the latter.
It is well-documented throughout the non-democratic world that rational self-interest motivates autocratic regimes to employ idiots, since they are more likely to provide loyal service and be obedient than the more intelligent servants of the autocratic state. Successful dictators have long understood this. Even Saddam Hussein once openly paired thugs in the upper ranks of the ruling Baath party with technocrats who knew what they were doing.
Perhaps here lies the answer to the widespread involvement in public administration, as well as in political representation (the Assembly), of individuals with criminal backgrounds; of those who, everywhere in the West, are subjects of investigation and eventually even criminal punishment, but who in the Albania of the last decade are known as "successful businessmen" and are important beneficiaries of PPP-type contracts, strategic investors, etc., in addition to mayors and MPs "whom the community loves", as Prime Minister Rama himself said some time ago.
The need for authoritarian regimes to promote the less capable is easy to understand in theory, but it has rarely been studied scientifically, since existing or aspiring autocracies, like ours, do not disclose their recruitment and promotion policies.
A few years ago, two well-known Western authors (A. Scharpf and Ch. Gläßel) wrote an interesting article entitled: “Why Underachievers Dominate Secret Police Organizations: Evidence from Autocratic Argentina,” which was published in the American Journal of Political Science. They examined the careers of 4,000 officers in the main institution of state repression in Argentina during the 1975-83 military dictatorship, asking: “Why would anyone do dirty work for the regime? Are these people sadistic psychopaths, sectarian fanatics, or forced by the regime to terrorize the population?”
They concluded that while all of these factors may play a role, the typical profile of secret police agents is shaped more by the day-to-day need to hold down a job and earn a promotion. Translate these conclusions to a country where, as of 2021, the percentage of Albania’s population living on less than $8.30 a day was estimated at 32.4%. This figure ($8.30 a day) is an international poverty line set by the World Bank for upper-middle-income countries. That is, how important is a job that provides a family’s livelihood, all the more so when, over the past five years, the poverty line indicator has increased, significantly exceeding the 1/3 of the country’s total resident population it was in 2021.
“In competition with more qualified colleagues, officials with poor initial performance have little chance of rising to the top of the most lucrative positions,” the authors wrote. “For those who do not achieve good results, the difficult nature of secret police work offers the opportunity to signal their value to the regime and to move ahead of competitors for higher positions.”
And here we come to our patronageists, that is, to that part of today's Albanian society that, under the guise of government propaganda, but especially under the impossibility of securing "bread for the day", is inextricably linked to power and serves to mobilize and exert pressure on the family, tribe or community to which it belongs, in exchange for maintaining or capturing a job as a way of penetrating the public sector; then increasing this presence in dependence on the power delegated by the "Supreme Leader" and its extensions at the various levels of administration.
Here is also the explanation for the "rule of one" in political parties, nepotism, provincialism, conflict of interest, and even the "legal" and illegal plundering of budgetary funds, public assets, and permits and licenses on behalf of the ruling clans that are taking hostage the present and economic future and development potential of our country.
That is, for the transformation, within just a decade, of the country's governance into an extra-constitutional business corporation of the "5D" type (i.e., specially created companies) to "legally" funnel 100% of the state budget, concession contracts, profitable permits and licenses, etc. into the pockets of political "profiteers".
It is shocking to realize that what was true for the Argentine security services half a century ago is likely to apply to Albania today. In practical terms, the country’s 184,000 public sector employees, or about a quarter of all employees in Albania (2024), “contributed” to securing more than 55% of the immigrant vote in the 2025 general elections.
That is, the current government exploited the immediate need to provide basic livelihoods (for the majority) and extra-legal benefits (for the ruling minority) of the public administration to reach out to significant segments of Albanian emigration abroad, who, ironically, have left the country precisely because of its misgovernance and the loss of hope that Albania can become a country where one can live and work normally...
"State capture", as a phenomenon that naturally follows the increase in grand corruption, the strengthening of organized crime and the coexistence of the ruling political elite with it, has many dimensions, and what we analyzed above is simply one of the instruments of capture. /BIRN/






















