When Fatmir Xhafaj took to the floor of Parliament and told the magistrates that they had "disappointed him a little", he actually opened a much bigger debate than the issue of salaries.
Because the problem is not just whether magistrates are demanding more, or whether the government is delaying a solution. The problem is that the decisions of the Constitutional Court in Albania are being read and implemented according to interest: with urgency when they open a payroll, calmly when they touch on other sensitive institutional issues.
The Constitutional Court, in a normal constitutional state, is the institution that sets the final standard on the interpretation of the Constitution. Its decisions should not be a political menu, a weapon of pressure, or an institutional alibi. They should be implemented equally, regardless of whether the government, the courts, magistrates, or any other public actor likes them.
This is precisely where the Albanian problem begins: not in the existence of the Constitutional Court, but in the way institutions and public actors choose to read and implement it.
Following the actions of former President Olta Zaçaj and another member, the Constitutional Court has suffered a blow to public perception. But even this damage does not overturn the fundamental principle: its decisions are binding and cannot be respected only when they serve as a convenient argument.
The case of Erion Veliaj is an example of this different standard. The Constitutional Court overturned the previous decision of the Supreme Court on the detention of the mayor of Tirana and returned the case for reconsideration.
This decision had several possible legal and political interpretations. It could be read as a procedural remark to the Supreme Court, as a request for a more complete reasoning, or as a need to more clearly weigh the relationship between the security measure, proportionality, and the mandate of a locally elected official.
But, despite these interpretations, that decision was not given much consideration in the public and institutional debate. It did not become a major issue for the standard of implementation of Constitutional Court decisions. It did not produce the same political, institutional or professional urgency that the salary decision is producing today.
On September 15, the Supreme Court ruled that Veliaj should remain in detention, upholding the March 13, 2025 decision of the Special Court of Appeal. With that, the debate on the real weight of the Constitutional Court's decision ended almost without a hitch.
Meanwhile, when the Constitutional Court ruled on magistrates' salaries, the decision immediately became an absolute reference. Magistrates' associations declare that they remain steadfast in their stance on the restoration of magistrates' constitutional rights, due to the open disregard for a Constitutional Court decision.
Here the main issue arises: the decisions of the Constitutional Court cannot have different weight according to the interest they produce.
If the constitutional standard is binding on wages, it should also be binding on every other issue where the Constitution comes into play, regardless of whether the decision is liked, criticized, or interpreted differently by the parties.
On the issue of salaries, the debate quickly shifted from constitutional principle to concrete calculations. Magistrates' associations, with the Constitutional Court's decision as a reference, are today talking about payrolls and financial formulas.
But if strict implementation of a constitutional decision is required, the same rigor should apply even in cases where the decision does not produce direct financial benefit.
The Constitutional Court is there to set the constitutional standard. Other institutions are there to implement it without selection.
At this point, the problem is not only legal. It is political, institutional and moral. Because in Albania, the Constitutional Court's decision risks being treated as an obligation only when it serves one party and as a procedural inconvenience when it benefits no one.
This is the most serious consequence of the "post-reform": a system where everyone refers to the Constitution, but each chooses the moment when they need it.
For this, Edi Rama must at least make a "mea culpa" for the way this institutional balance has been built and how it functions today. Because it is not enough for Fatmir Xhafaj to come to the Parliament podium with an empathetic tone and, very carefully, tell the magistrates: "You have disappointed me a little, guys!"
The greatest disappointment is not in the demands of the magistrates. It is in a system where Constitutional Court decisions are read with zeal when they produce benefit and passed over calmly when they demand accountability.
