In times of turmoil, it is up to political leaders to make the critical decisions necessary to protect their countries’ interests. These decisions are often shaped by an institutional sense of history. This is certainly true for Turkey today, as it grapples with the potential consequences of a US-Israeli war against Iran.
Turkey and Iran share an understanding of regional geopolitics that dates back centuries. Their border is among the oldest continuously recognized in the Middle East, and they have been at peace with each other since 1639.
Of course, Turkey and Iran are far from allies. Their interests have often diverged significantly, especially since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, and they have often been engaged in a zero-sum contest for regional influence. But their strategic rivalry has always been expressed indirectly: while both sides have often sought to shape regional dynamics in their favor, they have actively avoided direct confrontation.
This was most clearly seen recently in Syria. When mass protests against Bashar al-Assad’s dictatorship erupted in 2011, Turkey openly supported regime change. But Iran became a key ally of Assad, helping him weather more than a decade of civil war. It was only after Iran’s external influence waned in late 2022 that opposition forces – with Turkey’s help – managed to turn the tide of the conflict and, ultimately, topple the Assad dynasty.
Today, Turkey is so committed to avoiding a direct confrontation with Iran that it even downplayed Iran’s ballistic missile attack this week, which allegedly would have hit Incirlik Air Base in southern Turkey but for NATO air defenses. The government of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is skeptical about the feasibility of regime change in Iran—especially if the process is led by the United States. If President Barack Obama, who valued measured strategic planning by experienced leaders, lacked the patience and commitment to bring about regime change in Syria, how can Donald Trump’s chaotic administration succeed in Iran?
Even if the US succeeds in toppling the Iranian regime, an orderly transition is highly unlikely, if at all. For Turkey, state collapse in Iran is the worst-case scenario, closely followed by a cycle of violence similar to that in Syria, where a desperate regime faces an opposition that is empowered to fight but not strong enough to win quickly.
Whatever mess the United States and Israel create in Iran, Turkey will have to deal with the consequences, including large refugee flows. From the 1979 Iranian Revolution to the 1990-91 Gulf War to the recent Syrian civil war, regime change in Turkey’s neighborhood – or failed attempts to achieve it – has always placed a heavy security and humanitarian burden on the country. With an estimated 3.2 million refugees from Syria alone, Turkey is one of the world’s largest refugee-hosting countries. Iran’s population, at more than 90 million, is almost four times that of Syria.
Refugee flows from Iran would also put significant pressure on the Turkish economy, at a time when the country is struggling to rein in inflation that was once out of control. Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government has managed to bring inflation down from around 70% to 30% over the past two and a half years and aims to bring it down to single-digit levels before the next election cycle in 2028. Prolonged instability in Iran could significantly hamper this effort through rising oil prices and increasing risk aversion in international capital markets.
A keen awareness of these dangers led Turkey to try to avoid the current conflict, even offering to mediate in negotiations between the US and Iran. When those efforts failed, Oman intervened, and the talks – destined to fail – then moved to Switzerland, which has long served as a secret channel of communication between the two countries. Now Turkey is trying to help end the violence as soon as possible – before the Iranian regime falls.
However, while avoiding a protracted conflict and the disintegration of Iran is vital to Turkey's interests, it is equally important to ensure that the outcome of the war does not represent a victory for the regime. A victorious Islamic Republic would undoubtedly be encouraged to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and accelerate its efforts to become a nuclear-weapon state, or at least a near-nuclear state. A nuclear-armed Iran would upset the regional balance of power, which has recently tilted in Turkey's favor.
Therefore, Turkey’s preferred outcome would be a managed weakening of Iran’s ambitions and capabilities. The precedent of Venezuela may be useful here. When the US overthrew President Nicolas Maduro, it did not install an opposition government; instead, it allowed a manipulable ruling elite from within the existing regime to take power.
A similar approach could be pursued in Iran. If future leaders emerge from within the regime, they will retain the support of the domestic religious and political establishment and have sufficient legitimacy to accept a tough deal to halt uranium enrichment, limit Iran’s ballistic missile program, and end the destabilizing activities of Iran’s regional allies.
In the coming weeks, Turkish state and intelligence resources will likely focus on identifying and contacting key figures within Iran who fit this profile. Then, when the time is right, Turkey could try to connect these individuals with relevant international actors, paving the way for an early and lasting agreement to end the conflict./reporter.al
