In 2019, the United States backed an opposition leader seeking to overthrow Venezuela's Nicolas Maduro. Russia opposed the effort, offering diplomatic assistance and a small dose of military support to a government that could be Moscow's most important partner in Latin America.
Maduro survived the crisis when Juan Guaido's call for a military uprising failed and his attempt to seize power failed - a major relief for Russia and a blow to the US, which considers Maduro an illegitimate leader. During his first term as US president, Donald Trump recognized Guaido as Venezuela's interim president in January 2019.
While circumstances are very different today, the US is once again increasing pressure on Maduro.
It has deployed a large military presence in the Caribbean, where it is now sending an aircraft carrier – the USS Gerald R Ford, widely regarded as the world's largest warship – and has carried out a series of airstrikes on ships it suspects are trafficking drugs, killing dozens of people.
US officials have cited a 2020 indictment against Maduro for drug-related crimes, with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio calling him a “fugitive from US justice.” In August, the US doubled the reward for information leading to his capture, bringing the amount to $50 million.
In an interview broadcast on CBS on November 2, Trump downplayed concerns that the US would go to war with Venezuela, but when asked if Maduro's days were numbered, he said: "I think so."
Maduro is reportedly turning to Russia for support again, but analysts say that if Washington makes an attempt to overthrow him, Moscow's leverage to prevent such a thing is limited.
“Frankly, there is not much Russia can do if the US is determined to try to oust Maduro, beyond diplomatic moves,” said Mark Galeotti, an author, Russia analyst and emeritus professor at the School of Slavic and East European Studies at University College London.
Russia's war against Ukraine "precludes the deployment of Russian troops in Venezuela in the event of a US intervention," said Alexandra Sitenko, a Berlin-based political analyst. "However, limited support cannot be ruled out: Russia could transfer weapons, air defense systems or provide intelligence assistance."
"Russia will not go to war over Venezuela"
In an article published on October 31, The Washington Post said that the documents it had obtained showed a letter that Maduro had written to Russian President Vladimir Putin, asking Moscow to strengthen Venezuela's air defenses by deploying previously purchased Sukhoi fighter jets, helping to repair engines and radars, and purchasing missiles, as well as providing logistical support.
According to The Washington Post, the letter was supposed to be delivered to Putin by Venezuela's transport minister, who was in Moscow in mid-October. According to the outlet, Maduro was also seeking support from China and Iran.
It is unclear whether the letter was sent to the Kremlin. Neither Venezuelan nor Russian officials have commented on the report, and have made no public statements regarding any specific new support for the Maduro government.
However, a large Russian transport plane, an Il-76, arrived in Caracas in late October after a multi-stop journey, according to flight tracking website FlightData24. It is unclear what the plane was carrying.
Russian sources suggested it may have sent air defense systems, such as the Pantsir-S1, Sitenko told Radio Free Europe.
"This would be in line with Moscow's decision to urgently ratify a new partnership agreement with Venezuela, which includes provisions for military-technical cooperation to strengthen defense capabilities and provide security for both countries," she said.
"But Russia will not go to war for Venezuela," Sitenko stressed.
On November 1, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said that Moscow condemns “the use of excessive military force in carrying out actions in anti-drug operations” and “confirms our support for the Venezuelan leadership in defending its national sovereignty.”
Two days earlier, Zakharova stated that Russia "is in contact with our partners" and "is ready to continue to respond appropriately to their demands, taking into account existing and potential threats."
Putin and Maduro concluded the strategic partnership agreement with Moscow in May, and it came into effect when Putin signed the ratification law that was hastily passed by Parliament late last month. But such pacts are a legal framework and have few specific details.
Experts say most of Russia's military operations in the Western Hemisphere have largely been superficial and have served as a reminder to the West that Moscow's forces are able to operate further afield than they could when the state had limited resources after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.
Në vitin 2018, dy bombardues bërthamorë strategjikë rusë ateruan në një aeroport ushtarak në periferi të Karakasit. Në korrik të vitit 2024, dy anije të marinës ruse u ankoruan në Venezuelë para zgjedhjeve që zgjatën sundimin e Maduros dhe që u cilësuan si farsë nga SHBA-ja.
Gjatë përpjekjes për ta rrëzuar Maduron nga pushteti më 2019, Moska e pranoi se kishte personel ushtarak në terren, pasi disa fotografi treguan afër 100 ushtarë rusë duke dalë nga dy aeroplanë ushtarakë.
Në një raport të publikuar nga Instituti Kennan i Qendrës Wilson më 2020, me seli në SHBA, analisti Vladimir Rouvinski shkroi se “prania e parë e vazhdueshme e personelit ushtarak rus në Hemisferën Perëndimore” që nga tërheqja nga Kuba në fillim të viteve ’90 ishte “një shfaqje e qartë e vendosmërisë së Kremlinit për ta mbajtur Venezuelën brenda orbitës së Rusisë”.
“Shumë veprime të tjera të sponsorizuara ose të lehtësuara nga Rusia ndihmuan që Maduro të mbante pushtetin”, përfshirë bllokimin që Moska i bëri një rezolute të Këshillit të Sigurimit të OKB-së, të mbështetur nga SHBA-ja, shkroi Rouvinski. Por, në të njëjtën kohë, “kriza në Venezuelë vuri në pah shumë kufizime të politikës ruse”, siç është “mungesa e … burimeve financiare për të mbështetur politikën e saj në Amerikën Latine”.
Në vitin 2019, tha Sitenko, “faktori vendimtar për mbijetesën e Maduros nuk ishte ndihma ushtarake relativisht e kufizuar e Moskës, por refuzimi i forcave të armatosura venezuelase për të dalë në krahun e opozitës”.
Sot, burimet financiare dhe ushtarake të Moskës janë më të tkurrura sesa më 2019: Atëherë ishte tre vjet para se Putini të niste pushtimin në shkallë të plotë të Ukrainës, duke angazhuar shumicën e personelit dhe burimeve ushtarake për një luftë të kushtueshme, që fundi s’po i duket, dhe duke nxitur një valë sanksionesh ekonomike nga Perëndimi.
Edhe sikur Rusia të mos ishte e përfshirë në luftën më të madhe në Evropë që nga viti 1945, distanca e saj me Venezuelën do të përbënte kufizime të rëndësishme për një mbështetje të madhe, nëse do të ishte e nevojshme.
“Mendoj se nëse SHBA-ja është serioze lidhur me ndryshimin e regjimit në Venezuelë përmes forcës, Rusia ka pak gjasa që të mund ta ndihmojë në ndonjë mënyrë”, tha për Radion Evropa e Lirë Oleg Ignatov, analist i lartë për Rusinë në Grupin e Krizave. “Kjo ka qenë e pamundur si para ashtu edhe pas fillimit të luftës në Ukrainë. Gjeografia dhe logjistika janë faktorë kyç në këtë situatë”.
Trump ka dërguar mesazhe të përziera lidhur me atë nëse SHBA-ja po shqyrton sulme ndaj caqeve të lidhura me drogën brenda Venezuelës. “Toka do të jetë hapi i radhës”, tha ai më 23 tetor, duke komentuar sulmet ndaj anijeve. Por, më 31 tetor, kur u pyet nëse ishin të vërteta raportet mediatike se ai po shqyrtonte sulmet brenda Venezuelës, presidenti amerikan u përgjigj: “Jo”.
Maduro's overthrow would be a severe blow to Moscow, depriving it of a key presence in Latin America and would be similar to the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad in Syria in December 2024, which weakened the Kremlin's influence in the Middle East.
In addition to Maduro's status as an ally in Moscow's geopolitical confrontation with Washington and the West, Russia has invested heavily in oil production in Venezuela, which has the world's largest oil reserves, although US sanctions mean both countries are looking to sell oil to some of the same buyers, such as China.
With the war in Ukraine causing Moscow to focus on buying weapons for itself, Caracas has in the past been a major buyer of Russian weapons. Amid the growing US presence in the region, Maduro said on October 22 that Venezuela has 5,000 Russian-made Igla-S missiles “in key air defense positions.”
Despite the close ties between the two states, Moscow may see increased American pressure on Venezuela as a development that distracts Washington's attention from Ukraine, reducing the possibility of increasing pressure on Moscow to end the occupation.
Putin's Kremlin might see a positive side in Maduro's departure, if the US were to force him out of power.
"In a perverse way... Moscow would benefit from such an operation, as it would strengthen its claim that it is the West, and not Russia, the enemy of the Global South: arrogant, violent and imperialist," Galeotti said in written responses sent to Radio Free Europe.
"Ultimately, Russia is still able to find allies and clients in the Global South, whether for reasons of their convictions, but more often for pragmatic reasons, and it always exploits Western adventurism to reinforce its claim that the liberal global order is simply a ruse to subjugate the world in the service of Western interests," he said./ REL
