Europe must wake up to the risk of creating a new cocaine hub in West Africa, built by criminal gangs from the Western Balkans.
At first glance, the booming ports of West Africa and the criminal underworld of the Western Balkans seem like two different worlds. However, a closer look inside a container of cocoa husks – one of West Africa’s main exports – reveals a different cargo: cocaine.
Since 2019, criminal groups originating from the Western Balkans have increasingly turned to West Africa as a key transit route for cocaine trafficking. What was initially a casual trafficking point – in 2014, cocaine was shipped by small boats from northeastern Brazil to Cape Verde – has transformed into a cocaine hub for Europe and beyond. This ongoing shift has gone largely unnoticed.
A report by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, to which I contributed, reveals that Slavic and Albanian-speaking groups – traditionally located at key points in the cocaine supply chain [South America and Europe] – are now expanding their influence by targeting the vulnerable coasts of West Africa.
In countries such as Senegal, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde and Sierra Leone, Western Balkan groups have set up infrastructure to facilitate the storage, repackaging and shipping of cocaine. The sea remains the main trafficking route, although these groups have begun to explore alternative routes, including air routes with small aircraft.
Groups from the Western Balkans use four main trafficking methods through West Africa.
The first method involves maritime routes, where cocaine shipments travel directly from South America, via West Africa, to Europe. However, a large percentage of cocaine – including multi-ton shipments – arrives in West Africa outside of containers, with the drug hidden in the hulls of ships, for example.
The non-container export method passes through the Gulf of Guinea, avoiding landfall in West Africa. The process also involves imports and warehousing in West Africa, followed by exports to Europe.
The fourth method, where cargoes are loaded into containers within West Africa, effectively avoids the increased controls on exports from South America to European ports.
Several factors have made West Africa an attractive destination for groups from the Western Balkans: it is strategically located between Brazil – a major cocaine exporter – and the overcrowded markets of Europe; meanwhile, increased law enforcement has increased the risks of direct transatlantic routes from South America to Europe – with drug seizures on these routes increasing from 201.9 tonnes in 2019 to a record 424.1 tonnes in 2023. Meanwhile, weak controls at African ports mean that less than two percent of containers are regularly inspected.
Changes in South America are also driving this shift toward West Africa. As Brazilian authorities increased controls at major ports like Santos, traffickers began redirecting cargoes to the less monitored waters of West Africa. And groups from the Western Balkans – with flexible, decentralized structures and reliable logistics networks – were ideally positioned to adapt.
The middlemen who built a cocaine empire
Common language and cultural ties serve as a basis for cooperation between groups in the Western Balkans. Two main networks dominate: one consisting of Albanian-speaking groups and the other of Slavic-speaking groups – including Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks and Montenegrins.
Currently, these networks operate through adaptable structures that facilitate broad collaboration. They are typically composed of small, tightly knit groups, with flexible memberships that typically range from 10 to 20 individuals.
The Kavac and Skaljari clans are the two main Slavic-speaking groups operating in West Africa, along with their allies. Based in Montenegro, these groups maintain extensive links with organizations in Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, and other Balkan countries.
The Kavac clan has established a network in West Africa, while the Skaljari clan operates primarily through associates from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania, demonstrating a broader international presence.
On the other hand, West Africa remains largely unknown territory for Albanian groups, with the exception of the network associated with Armando Pacani.
Initially, Pacani's shipments went directly to European ports via containers. After cocaine losses and international arrest warrants, his network switched to transporting multi-ton loads from northeastern Brazil to West Africa by fishing boats in mid-2022. The network is suspected of relying on an African middleman. Pacani and his lawyers deny any involvement in criminal activities.
The organizational structure of groups involved in cocaine trafficking in West Africa includes distinct roles, usually leaders, intermediaries, and executors.
Leaders negotiate directly with cocaine producers in South America, issue transportation orders, and oversee financial matters, including expenses and profits. Middlemen coordinate smuggling routes, liaise with contacts in West Africa, and manage financial transfers, all while ensuring operational security. Enforcers—usually local individuals from the areas where operations take place—are responsible for collecting and delivering the drugs, securing storage facilities, and maintaining safe houses.
The real power behind cocaine operations is not just the criminal groups, but also the middlemen – whether on the ground for a long time or for limited periods. These middlemen have important connections throughout West Africa and are linked, directly or indirectly, to protection networks in the region. Identifying the middlemen is often difficult due to the use of false identities and the high level of protection they manage to provide.
Unlike the visible “bosses” of previous eras, today’s middlemen operate in the shadows and with a credible image that belies direct involvement. They move quickly, avoid detection, and use networks of local middlemen. This creates a criminal model that is very difficult to identify, but even harder to dismantle.
One figure who embodies the role of middleman is Mario Krezic, a Bosnian-Croatian national linked to several criminal networks across the Western Balkans. His name appears in several indictments in Serbia and Croatia, and coded messages captured by platforms like Sky ECC allegedly link him to large cocaine shipments transiting through West Africa.
Law enforcement sources believe Krezic operated out of Freetown, Sierra Leone, coordinating logistics across the Atlantic. He is accused of organizing ship-to-ship transfers, overseeing imports in coastal areas, managing the storage and loading of drugs into containers, and organizing shipments to European ports, particularly Antwerp.
In this role, Krezic allegedly served as a key point in a global supply chain, connecting Latin American suppliers, African middlemen and European buyers, while constantly changing local partners to avoid detection.
His case reflects the growing role of middlemen as dexterous, low-profile figures who run the cocaine trade from behind the scenes. Krezic remains a wanted man by law enforcement.
What comes next?
Groups from the Western Balkans are expanding their presence in West Africa. They are expected to operate with greater independence, moving away from dependence on alliances with criminal organizations in Brazil and, in some cases, Italy. These groups are expected to invest directly in local infrastructure and security.
Similar to trends observed in South America, their growing influence could lead to increased corruption, escalating violence, and fragmentation into smaller, more autonomous groups.
Europe has been slow to respond to the challenge of direct cocaine trafficking from South America and should not repeat the same mistake with West Africa. Currently, law enforcement cooperation between the Western Balkans, West Africa and the EU is fragmented. There are no dedicated networks for information exchange, while local capacities in African countries remain underfunded.
The consequences can be serious.
Cocaine bound for Europe can increasingly be purchased directly from warehouses in West Africa. In this scenario, West Africa will no longer be just a transit zone, but will become a cocaine market. Even emerging markets such as Asia and Australia have begun to report shipments traced to the Gulf of Guinea. If this situation is not addressed, it could accelerate the fragmentation of cocaine trafficking networks, trigger new waves of violence, and create entrenched criminal enclaves on both sides of the Atlantic.
To avoid this worst-case scenario, the EU and the Western Balkans need to invest in long-term cross-continental cooperation with African partners – not only through donor-funded workshops, but also through meaningful intelligence sharing, joint naval operations, and coordinated sanctions against key brokers.
Financial intelligence must keep pace with the war on drugs.
Tracing the money trail of these networks requires more skills from law enforcement structures. The strategic target should be the middlemen and their supply chains. Too often, drug seizures are celebrated while the real architects of the trafficking remain free.
Interrupting the human logistics of this market – not just seizing the drugs – is key to stopping its momentum.
Source: Reporter.al
