By Desada Metaj
Edi Rama made his decision. He has submitted the request to the Constitutional Court. Camouflage by following the institutional path in the CC is nothing more than confronting the new justice, disrespecting its verdicts and, more than that, a descent into the open field in support of impunity.
To be clear: at first glance, addressing institutions – in this case the Criminal Court – seems like institutional behavior. And, on the surface, this is true. This line has nothing to do with “arbitrary actions against justice” (referring, for example, to Berisha’s behavior on January 21, when he refused the prosecutor’s orders to detain the guards). It also has nothing to do with “rhetorical battle,” which he disqualified as a variant, even though he has routinely used the latter against judges and prosecutors by name and surname (remember the prosecutor and judge who had given the decisions in the cases of IKMT’s objections to Rama’s abusive demolitions of buildings). In all cases, these have been Edi Rama’s usual facade.
Essentially, his investment in the Constitutional Court is to "put his chest" on Balluk's defense by declaring SPAK and GJKKO as enemies, as opponents that must be defeated, because - as he himself says - "the suspension from office of a minister, in this case also the deputy prime minister, directly for leading the government, is a manifestation of the weaknesses of a completely new power and anti-democratic reflexes. A unique case in the history of Europe and of the special justice bodies that have been created in the integration processes. It has never happened that a prosecutor and a judge come together face to face and suspend a member of the government from office."
His labeling of SPAK prosecutors and judges as "incompetent", "young people with anti-democratic reflexes", "flagrant decision", or defining the limits of how far the new justice system can go and where it should not touch, betray the true motive that drives him in this undertaking.
In legal terms, this is not and cannot be Rama's battle. It is Balluk's. She is the defendant, she is under criminal proceedings and under a suspended sentence. She must fight this legal battle – like many others, people close to Rama, who have done the same thing. Rama's statement that whoever has problems with justice should solve them themselves, that they are not the PS's problems, has now become iconic. Meanwhile, it has now turned out that Balluk's problem is also Rama's. His direct investment itself proves this.
Why is it different this time?
Seven hours of face-to-face meetings at the Prime Minister's Office are a bit much to study the Constitution or the Code of Criminal Procedure. Moreover, Ulsi's presence should have clarified the legal situation in a split second, due to his outstanding knowledge as a former prosecutor, former Minister of Justice and currently chairman of the Laws Commission. Ulsi must have already understood that undertaking the trajectory of the appeal to the CC is more of a political act than a legal act.
It is the act by which the highest political boss in the Republic offers protection to his loyal subordinate, as a reward for the fanatical loyalty she has shown to him. Loyalty that now demands retribution. And this explains Rama's political investment in primis personae.
However, it is not known whether Ulsiu has explained to Rama (or whether he has always understood himself) the entire trajectory that this legal meander entails. However, Rama has made his intuitive analysis for each of the two expected outcomes in the Court of Cassation.
First result: rejection of the request.
The Court's previous behavior on similar issues suggests this. The case where 1/5 of Berisha's deputies approached the Court claiming that the travel ban in the "Partizani" case was illegal ended in a dismissal.
Even Rama's claim of a conflict of powers, similar to Berisha's, seems unfounded. SPAK has not usurped any powers from the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister, in relation to the status of a minister, has only two powers: the proposal of appointment and the proposal of dismissal. SPAK has neither appointed Ms. Balluku nor dismissed her. She continues to be a minister and deputy prime minister, but suspended due to the provisions of Article 242/2 of the Criminal Procedure Code. There is nothing to usurp from the Prime Minister on this point, and consequently there can be no conflict of powers with him.
Secondly, if Rama claims that the Prime Minister determines the legal status of the minister (appointment/dismissal) and that SPAK has intervened in this procedure, this is not true: “The Minister is appointed and dismissed by the President of the Republic” – says Article 98/1 of the Constitution. The Prime Minister only has the right to propose. So “ownership” over the minister is divided between the President, the Prime Minister and the Assembly.
And if someone claims that SPAK has been entangled in this triad's footsteps, then all three should have come together and raised this dispute over competences. Currently, neither the President nor the Assembly seem to claim that anyone has usurped any competences.
Third, everyone understands that this supposedly constitutional stunt is nothing more than a "camouflaged appeal" directly to the Court of Cassation, bypassing the normal path: appeal to the Appeals Court, then to the Supreme Court, and then to the Court of Cassation - as others have followed. And everyone understands that this bypass is a scam.
Without prejudging the decision of the CC, it seems clear that this legal line of Edi Rama is weak and most likely unsuccessful. Even if, through the methods he knows, he were to put pressure on the CC and triumph, the public would be left with the bitter taste that everything was the Prime Minister's work and that Balluku's "victory" would have a huge political cost, because it would be clear that the political pressure would have worked.
Moreover, such a victory would give SPAK full justification to then request the measure of "prison arrest" or "house arrest", as variants that have no constitutional misunderstanding - moreover, as the same standard as the Meta, Veliaj, Bllako, Beqja and co. cases.
Therefore, it would be gross mediocrity for Rama or his advisors – among them Ulsiu – not to have foreseen these cascading effects. But most likely, Rama trusts his intuition more than the advice of lawyers. And he understands that such an investment would not be worth it just for the fate of Balluk.
The most logical explanation is simple: Rama has shown Balluk that, faced with her blind loyalty, he did his best by investing himself personally – but with no guarantee of success. After that, he would feel free from obligations towards Balluk.
The unknown is how much Balluku herself accepts this "sacrifice" of Rama. It is understandable that her only interest is not to "get out of Rama's hands" and fall into the hands of prosecutors, because she knows very well that her fate after this will be, let's say, like that of Veliaj, Meta, Beqaj, etc. This remains to be seen.
The second option (less quoted, but not impossible): accepting the request.
Rama has been invested in the Criminal Court not only as a friendly obligation towards Balluk, but because it provides that the practice of suspension can be applied, with the same standard, to the figure of the Prime Minister.
The legal status of the minister and deputy prime minister is the same as that of the Prime Minister: therefore, it is a suspendable state function according to Article 242/2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
And only he and Balluku know how involved he is in the case she is being prosecuted for. Or even in any other similar criminal case, current or future.
In this case, he is preempting his own fate: if he imposes a new standard on the CC (i.e. that members of the Council of Ministers are not suspended by SPAK), then not only Balluku benefits today, but every minister – and above all, he himself as Prime Minister, tomorrow. An important, valuable victory for him.
And if this is truly the most quoted option, then it is worth the burden of having it imposed by any means and method against the Constitutional Court.
The public declamation of this initiative, even under the watchful eye of Marta Kos, contained the appropriate doses of seriousness for this commitment.
In this perspective, perhaps the two-month delay in the appointment of the new Constitutional Court judge, Asim Vokshi, makes sense. The comfort with the outgoing presiding judge of the Constitutional Court, Holta Zaçe, and the meaningless obstacles to the arrival of the new judge (which may disrupt the fragile balance within the court), may be part of this scenario.
This is the equation that fits what we said at the top: a final fight with justice, without gloves. Public pressure on the Constitutional Court will be high, and this is understandable. Along with it, pressures of other kinds. Therefore, it is the next test for the Constitutional Court – which, like the SPAK, the GJKKO and the Supreme Court, must be shown to be up to the task. At least, the Constitutional Court cannot complain that it was not warned about the danger.
