For decades, power in Iran has been centralized in the hands of a single man: the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
But since his assassination at the start of the US-Israeli war with Iran on February 28, the decision-making process in Tehran has become increasingly decentralized, experts say.
Mojtaba Khamenei has not been seen in public since succeeding his father in early March.
In his absence, a group of senior Iranian officials have effectively taken over the running of the country.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – a dominant political actor – has now become the decisive force in Iran, experts say.
Reformists and moderates have been pushed, they say, to the fringes of politics, leading to a harsher and more ideologically rigid system.
Important power centers and figures have emerged in what some observers call "Islamic Republic 3.0."
Although many of these figures are of the same mind on key policies, some cracks have begun to appear among them.
Mojtaba Khamenei – the new supreme leader
As supreme leader, the 56-year-old has the final say on all state matters.
But his authority has been weakened from the beginning.
Khamenei has been a controversial choice for the post of supreme leader.
The cleric has never held public office before, so some have viewed his appointment as a move toward "dynastic succession," which would call into question the very anti-monarchist roots of the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
Seriously injured in the airstrike that killed his father, Khamenei has been absent from the public eye since his appointment on March 8.
He suffered wounds to his head, lower back and leg, but is now “in good health,” Mazahar Hosseini, chief of protocol at the Supreme Leader’s Office, said on May 8.
US intelligence services have said they believe Khamenei plays an important role in war strategy and in managing peace talks with the United States.
But, in a system where the supreme leader is always present – through audio messages, video appearances, and public appearances to display his authority – his absence is noticeable.
"Iran has entered a period of transition following the death of Ali Khamenei and the end of his 36 years of leadership," Washington-based Iranian political analyst Ali Afshari told Radio Free Europe's Radio Farda.
"It is a challenging period, in which the alignment of forces after the war will be crucial," he adds.
Hossein Taeb – behind-the-scenes cameraman
A hardline cleric, Hossein Taeb led the intelligence branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) for 13 years, until 2022, when he was dismissed as part of a major security shakeup.
Taeb, who is blacklisted by the United States and the European Union for his alleged role in state repression, worked in the Office of the Supreme Leader before being appointed IRGC intelligence chief in 2009.
An early loyalist of the young Khamenei, Taeb is considered an important figure behind the scenes.
Experts say he could play an important role in managing Khamenei's relationships with key players within the system.
Ahmad Vahidi – head of the IRGC
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the elite wing of Iran's armed forces, has always played a key role in politics.
But, after the assassination of Ali Khamenei, it has become the dominant political force in the Islamic Republic.
This, despite the fact that Israel and the United States have severely hit the IRGC leadership, even killing its commander-in-chief, Mohammad Pakpour.
Pakpour's deputy, Ahmad Vahidi, a former interior and defense minister, took over the IRGC in early March.
But experts say it remains unclear whether Vahid has the weight and credibility to unite competing factions within the Revolutionary Guard.
According to them, the war and increased security in Iran, following the death of Ali Khamenei, have given the IRGC a central role in the country's domestic and foreign policy.
"The era after Ali Khamenei remains unclear. However, one key fact is evident: the growing role and power of the IRGC in the administration of the Islamic Republic," France-based Iranian political commentator Mojtaba Najafi tells Radio Farda.
"Today, a significant part of the country's administration is in the hands of the IRGC. Militarization in the economy, politics, culture and society has already reached a consolidated stage," he adds.
Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf – the mediator
Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf is a conservative politician and former military commander who, for decades, has built strong ties to Iran's supreme leadership and the Revolutionary Guard (IRGC).
After a career marked by corruption scandals and several unsuccessful presidential runs, he is today seen as one of the most powerful figures left in the Islamic Republic.
Experts describe Qalibafi – the speaker of parliament and Iran's chief negotiator with the United States – as a mediator between the country's various centers of power.
He is also considered close to the new supreme leader.
This is the role previously held by Iran's security chief, Ali Larijani, who was assassinated in March.
Larijani has been a unifying figure, uniting competing political factions and maintaining strong ties to the IRGC, the intelligence apparatus, and the clerical establishment.
"Qalibaf has always been a 'chess piece' used by the leadership," Germany-based political analyst Hossein Razzaq tells Radio Farda.
"Today, with the elimination of other important 'stones', the role it plays for the system has become more pronounced," according to him.
Mohammad Baqer Zolqadr – security chief
Former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander Mohammad Baqer Zolqadr has succeeded Larijani as head of Iran's Supreme National Security Council - the country's top decision-making body.
While Larijani is known as a pragmatic and calculated politician, Zolqadr represents the hardline military and security line.
According to Razzaq, his appointment is seen as an attempt by the leader to distribute power among his loyalists.
He adds that this election further underscores the IRGC's dominance in the various centers of power in Iran.
Masoud Pezeshkian – the powerless president
The reformist president, Masud Pezeshkian, is not a significant political actor and is not considered a threat by the hardliners that dominate the system.
Pezeshkian's role is primarily administrative, managing the day-to-day affairs of the Government, because final decisions on major issues, including war and diplomacy, are made elsewhere.
He and Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi are the only representatives of the reformist camp who have a visible role in the new power structure.
Like Pezeshkiani, Araqchi has no decision-making power, but implements decisions that come from above.
Thus, differences within the system have begun to emerge: on one side are those who support diplomacy, like Pezeshkiani and Araqchi, and on the other side stand the generals who oppose any compromise with the United States to end the war./ REL
